

Appendix 1  
Additional Tables and Methodological Note

*Table 11. Summary of Cases in Western Hemisphere*

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>Episode(s)</u>	<u>Coercive Performance</u>	<u>Framing Performance</u>	<u>Compliance</u>	<u>Other Outcomes</u>
US-Panama	1989-1990	2.75	.25	0	AC 0, T 0, DS .33
US-Peru	1992-1993	2.41	.25	0	AC 1, T -.67, DS .67
US-Peru/Ecuador*	1995	3.67	.75	1	AC 1, T 1, DS .33
US-Nicaragua	1989-1990	3.08	.5	1	AC .33, T .67, DS .67
	2018-2020	2.42	.75	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .33
US-Guatemala	1993-1996	2.97	1	.67	AC .33, T 0 DS .67
	2018-2019	3.42	.5	1	AC .33, T 0, DS 1
US-Cuba	1992-2000	1.24	0	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS 1
	2001-2008	1.16	0	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS 1
	2009-2016	1.75	.25	.33	AC .67, T 0, DS .67
	2017-2020	1.41	.25	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 1
US-Haiti	1992-1994	4	1	1	AC .67, T .67, DS .67
US-Columbia	1996-1998	3.01	.5	1	AC 1, T 1, DS .33
US-Paraguay	1996	2.75	1	1	AC .33, T .67, DS .67
US-Ecuador	1999-2000	3.76	1	1	AC .67, T .67, DS .33
US-Guyana	2001	3.59	1	1	AC .33, T .33, DS .67
US-Argentina	2012-2016	2.59	.5	1	AC .33, T -.67, DS 1
US-Venezuela	2014-2020	2.5	.25	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS .67
US-Mexico	2017-2019	3.42	.5	1	AC 1, T .67, DS 1
US-Canada	2017-2019	3.59	.25	1	AC 0, T 0, DS .33
Average		2.77	.53	.6	AC .4, T .02, DS .67

Table 12. Summary of Cases in Middle East and Central Asia

<b>Dyad</b>	<b>Episode(s)</b>	<b>Coercive Performance</b>	<b>Framing Performance</b>	<b>Compliance</b>	<b>Other Outcomes</b>
US-Iraq	1990-1991	3.25	.5	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .67
	1991-1992	2.26	.25	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .67
	1993-1996	1.75	.5	0	AC .33, T -1, DS .67
	1997-2000	1.17	0	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .67
	2001-2003	2.67	.25	0	AC .33, T -1, DS 1
	2007-2009	3.50	.5	1	AC .67, T 0 DS 1
US-Iran	1992-2000	2.34	.5	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS .67
	2001-2008	2.49	.25	0	AC .33, T -.67, DS .67
	2009-2016	2.09	.5	0	AC .33, T -.67, DS .67
	2017-2020	2.84	.25	0	AC .33, T -.67, DS 1
US-Afghanistan	1996-2000	2.91	.75	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .67
	2001	3.67	.75	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 1
US-Syria	2004-2009	2.34	.75	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .33
	2011-2016	1.58	.5	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .33
	2017-2020	3.08	.5	.67	AC .33, T -.33, DS 1
US-Lebanon	2003-2008	2.83	.25	0	AC .67, T -.33, DS 1
	2009-2016	1.99	.5	0	AC .33, T -.33, DS 1
US-Yemen/Jordan*	1990-1997	2.49	.25	0	AC .67, T .67, DS .33
US-Yemen	2011-2020	2.33	.75	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS 0
US-Azerbaijan	1991-2001	3.25	0	0	AC .33, T .33, DS 1
US-Kyrgyzstan	2020	3.25	.25	0	AC .33, T 0, DS .67
US-Palestinian Authority	2017-2020	2.42	0	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 1
Average		2.57	.40	.08	AC .23, T -.61, DS .73

Table 13. Summary of Cases in Europe

<b><u>Dyad</u></b>	<b><u>Episode(s)</u></b>	<b><u>Coercive Performance</u></b>	<b><u>Framing Performance</u></b>	<b><u>Compliance</u></b>	<b><u>Other Outcomes</u></b>
US-Yugoslavia	1992-1994	2.84	.25	1	AC .67, T 0, DS .33
	1992-1996	2.26	.25	0	AC 0, T -1, DS .67
	1998-2001	1.75	.5	0	AC .33, T -1, DS .67
U.S.-Russia	2009-2016	2.67	.25	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 1
	2012-2016	2.58	.5	0	AC .33, T -1, DS 1
	2017-2020	2.66	.5	0	AC .33, T -.67, DS 1
U.S.-Turkey	2018	3.51	.5	1	AC 0, T -.33, DS 1
	2019	3.50	.25	.67	AC .67, T -.67, DS 1
	2019-2020	3.09	.25	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 1
U.S.-Belarus	2004-2020	2.83	.5	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 0
U.S.-Germany	2017-2020	3.00	.25	0	AC 1, T 0, DS 1
U.S.-Hungary	2012-2018	2.59	.5	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS .67
Average		2.77	.38	.22	AC .28, T -.70, DS .77

Table 14. Summary of Cases in South and East Asia

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>Episode(s)</u>	<u>Coercive Performance</u>	<u>Framing Performance</u>	<u>Compliance</u>	<u>Other Outcomes</u>
US-Pakistan	1990-2000	2.68	.25	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS .33
	2001	3.58	1	.67	AC 1, T .33, DS 1
	2009-2016	2.16	.5	0	AC .67, T -.33, DS .67
	2017-2020	2.41	.5	.33	AC 1, T -.33, DS .67
U.S.-China (episodes overlap)	1990-1999	1.91	0	0	AC 0, T -.33, DS 1
	1990-2000	1.75	.25	0	AC .67, T 0, DS 1
	1996-1997	3.67	.25	1	AC .33, T .33 DS 1
	2017-2020	2.25	.75	0	AC .67, T -.67 DS 1
U.S.-North Korea	1992-2000	3.17	.25	0	AC 1, T 0, DS 1
	2000-2008	2.67	.25	0	AC .33, T -.33, DS .33
	2009-2016	2.49	.25	0	AC 1, T .33 DS 1
	2017-2020	2.75	.5	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 1
U.S.-Cambodia	1993-1997	2.83	.5	0	AC 0, T -1, DS 0
	1997-2007	2.83	.25	0	AC .33, T -.33, DS .33
	2017-2020	2.01	.25	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS .67
U.S.-India	1992-1993 (w/Russia)	3.68	.25	1	AC .33, T 0, DS .67
	1998-2001	2.24	0	0	AC 0, T .67 DS 1
U.S.-Thailand	1991-1993	3.17	.25	0	AC .33, T 0 DS .33
	2006-2008	2.08	0	.33	AC .67, T 0 DS.33
	2014-2019	2.58	.5	.33	AC .67, T 0 DS .67
U.S.-Myanmar	1992-2000	2.99	.25	.33	AC .33, T -.33 DS .67
	2000-2012	2.66	.25	.33	AC .33, T 0 DS 1
	2012-2016	2.99	.25	.33	AC 1, T .67 DS .67
	2016-2020	1.00	.25	0	AC 0, T -.67 DS .33
U.S.-Indonesia	1991-1999	2.91	.5	.67	AC .33, T -1 DS 1
U.S.-Fiji	2007-2014	2.91	.5	0	AC 0, T -1 DS 0

U.S.-Laos	2018-2020	2.99	.25	0	AC 0, T -.33 DS .67
U.S.-Philippines	2020	1.92	.5	0	AC .33, T .33 DS 1
Average		2.62	.34	.19	AC .40, T -.23, DS .69

Table 15. Summary of Cases in Africa

<u>Dyad</u>	<u>Episode(s)</u>	<u>Coercive Performance</u>	<u>Framing Performance</u>	<u>Compliance</u>	<u>Other Outcomes</u>
Somalia	1992-1995	2.00	0	0	AC 0, T -.67, DS .33
	2010-2013	2.33	.75	0	AC .67, T 0 DS 0
	2010-2016	3.16	1	.33	AC 0, T 0, DS .33
	2017-2020	3.51	.5	0	AC 0, T 0 DS .33
Sudan	1990-2000	2.83	.25	1	AC .92, T 0, DS .67
	2000-2008	3.08	.25	.67	AC .33, T .33, DS 1
	2009-2016	3.67	.25	.33	AC .33, T .33 DS .83
	2017-2020	3.26	.75	.33	AC 1, T .33 DS .33
Burundi	1996-2003	3.17	.25	0	AC 1, T .33, DS .33
	2015-2020	2.91	.25	0	AC .33, T -.67, DS .33
DRC	1990-1997	2.74	1	0	AC .33, T -.33 DS .33
	2006-2020	3.34	.25	.67	AC .33, T .67, DS .33
Eritrea	2008-2018	3.08	.5	0	AC 1, T 0 DS 0
	2017-2020	2.99	.25	0	AC 0, T 0, DS .33
Gambia	1994-2002	2.59	.25	0	AC 1, T 0, DS 0
	2016-2017	3.84	1	1	AC .33, T .67 DS 1
Libya	1996-2007	3.5	1	1	AC 0, T .33 DS .67
	2011-2020	2.66	1	0	AC 0, T -.67 DS 0 Ivory
Malawi	1991-1993	3.50	1	.67	AC .33, T 1 DS .33
	2011-2012	3.16	.75	0	AC .67, T .33 DS .33
Niger	1996-1999	2.08	.75	0	AC .67, T -.67 DS .33
	2009-2011	2.41	1	0	AC .67, T 1 DS 0
Nigeria	1995-2000	2.67	.5	0	AC .33, T 1 DS 1
	2020	2.83	.5	0	AC 0, T 0 DS .33
Rwanda	1994-1996	2.91	.25	.5	AC .5, T -.5 DS 0
	2006-2020	3.16	0	0	AC .33, T .33 DS 0

Cameroon	1990-1998	2.17	.5	0	AC 0, T -.33 DS 0
CAR	2012-2014	3.25	.5	0	AC 1 T .33 DS 0
Chad	2017-2018	3.51	.5	1	AC 0, T .67 DS .67
Egypt	2016-2017	3.17	.25	1	AC .67, T .33 DS .33
Ghana	2019-2020	2.83	.5	1	AC 0, T 0 DS .33
Guinea	2017-2018	2.83	.75	1	AC 0, T .33 DS .5
Ivory Coast	1999-2016	2.08	.25	0	AC .33, T 0 DS 0
Kenya	1991-1993	2.68	.5	0	AC 0, T .17, DS .42
Mali	2019-2020	2.51	.5	0	AC .25, T -.67 DS 0
Mauritania	2008-2009	3.59	.5	.67	AC .33, T .33 DS 0
Sierra Leone	2017-2020	2.83	.5	0	AC 1, T 0 DS .33
South Sudan	2014-2020	3.33	.25	0	AC 1, T 0 DS .33
Zambia	1996-1998	2.91	.25	0	AC .33, T -.33 DS 0
Zimbabwe	2002-2020	2.67	.5	0	AC 0, T -.33 DS 0
Average		2.94	.51	.26	AC .41, T .03, DS .33

Table 16. Views on US Coercive Diplomacy's Frequency, Breadth, and Long-term Effectiveness

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Balanced Effectively</u>	<u>Did Not Balance Effectively</u>	<u>Mixed Performance or Depends</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	2	24	4	30
International	1	27	2	30

Table 17. Views on US Consideration of Target-specific Coercive Context

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Effectively Accounted</u>	<u>Did Not Effectively Account</u>	<u>Mixed Performance or Depends</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	1	20	9	30
International	0	29	1	30

Table 18. Views on States' Diverse Responses to US Coercive Diplomacy

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Seek External Patron or Network</u>	<u>Mobilize Domestic Resistance</u>	<u>External Network + Domestic Resistance</u>	<u>Strategic Patience &amp; Manipulate US System</u>	<u>Mix of All</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	5	6	7	7	5	30
International	4	4	10	4	8	30

Table 19. Views on Clarity of US Intent During Coercive Episodes.

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Yes (sincere)</u>	<u>No (disingenuous)</u>	<u>Split (initial/ultimate)</u>	<u>Varies by Administration</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	4	8	3	15	30
International	3	10	7	10	30

Table 20. Views on How the US Adapts During Coercive Episodes.

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Has Effective Method</u>	<u>Does Not Have Effective Method</u>	<u>Partially Effective Method</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	3	23	4	30
International	5	20	5	30

Table 21. Views on Effectiveness of Use of Diplomatic Tools with Other Measures.

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Undercuts Effectiveness</u>	<u>Does not Undercut</u>	<u>Mixed Effect</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	16	8	6	30
International	17	5	8	30

Table 22. Views on CD's Effect on US Reputation as a Global Leader.

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Yes CD a Primary Cause</u>	<u>No CD Not a Primary Cause</u>	<u>Effect of CD on Reputation Not Clear</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	16	8	6	30
International	15	12	3	30

Table 23. Views on Primary Motive for US CD

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>More About Geopolitics</u>	<u>More About Domestic Politics</u>	<u>More About Rights/Values</u>	<u>Mixed/Depends</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	14	8	0	8	30
International	12	9	0	9	30

Table 24. Views on Long-term Effects of US CD

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Significantly Diminishing Effectiveness</u>	<u>Not Significantly Diminishing Effectiveness</u>	<u>Mixed Prospects</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	23	3	4	30
International	23	2	5	30

Table 25. Views on Why the US Sustains High Rates of CD

<u>Respondent Group</u>	<u>Political Structure and Culture</u>	<u>Bureaucratic Design and Process</u>	<u>Misreading International Environment or Other Causes</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	17	6	7	30
International	16	9	5	30



## Methodological Note

### *Defining the Set of Coercive Episodes (“ruling in”)*

The set of coercive episodes used in this study was identified through review of previous secondary sources, databases on conflict, coercion, and diplomacy, and examination of press and government records from the period under study (1990-2020). Prominent secondary sources examining cases of U.S. coercive diplomacy begin with Alexander George’s *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* and *Forceful Persuasion*<sup>1</sup>. The former examined 1960s-era cases of U.S. coercive diplomacy in Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba, while the latter added 1940s-era coercion of Japan, plus later cases involving Libya, Iraq (first Gulf) and Nicaragua. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin supplemented George’s studies with their 2003 *United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, adding the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, North Korea, Iraq, China (1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis) and terrorism. Rob De Wijk’s excellent *Why the West’s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters* (2014) examined cases of asymmetric coercion in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, while Mikael Wigell, Sören Scholvin, and Mika Aaltola’s 2019 *Geo-economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century* assessed the cases of Iran and Libya. Peter Viggo Jakobsen’s 1998 *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War* focuses on Iran and Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia.

Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliot and Barbara Oegg produced a thorough analysis of economic coercion, documenting and scoring 204 episodes of 20<sup>th</sup>-century sanctions with their *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (2009). Robert Pape argued for the primacy of military rather than economic coercion in *Bombing to Win* (1996) based on the U.S. experience with Iraq, as well as older cases (Germany, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam). Barry Blechman and

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<sup>1</sup>For citations and other information on the works cited in this Appendix, see end notes and index.

Tamara Cofman Witte's 1999 study in *Political Science Quarterly* also focused on military coercion, and cited eight cases: Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Serbia (Macedonia) Serbia (Bosnia) Haiti, North Korea, China (Taiwan 1996). More recently, Blechman's 2020 *Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy* covered Syria, Iran, Iraq, the western Balkans, Russia and China. Schultz' 2001 *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* took an integrated look at economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions of coercion, but his 1800 crises among 170 countries from 1816 to 1984 are unfortunately beyond the time frame of the current study. Tara Maller's 2010 article in *The Washington Quarterly* added a good deal of texture to the case of 1990s-era U.S. coercion of Sudan. There are also a number of detailed dissertations and theses on specific coercive episodes, including Cheraglou (Iran) and Schore (Syria, Somalia, and Libya).

The cases laid out in these studies were supplemented through review of relevant conflict databases and projects that include cases of coercion short of war. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) database maintained by Duke University was created after twenty-five years of research by Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and colleagues, and the Version 10 website presents data and summaries for 455 crises, 35 protracted conflicts, and 1000 state actors for the period 1918-2007. Subsequent updates (to Version 12) update coverage to 2015 and 21 additional crises. The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set compiled by the Correlates of War Project provides information about conflicts in which one or more states threatened, displayed, or used force against one or more other states between 1816 and 2010. The data set included roughly 2400 disputes with a militarized component. UVA's Todd Sechser produced another significant database (Militarized Compellent Threat Dataset or MCTD). Kenneth Schultz' Coercive Diplomacy Database (CDDDB) was produced between 2003-2005 with cases drawn from ICB and MID and expanded into dyadic format. The University of Central

Arkansas' Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) data set presents external interventions in intrastate or domestic disputes, and is an excellent resource for tracking key historical events in specific dispute episodes. Foreign Assistance data from the State Department and USAID is available at [foreignassistance.gov](https://foreignassistance.gov), and was used to confirm cutoffs and resumptions of aid as part of coercive episodes. Several studies based on these datasets were also reviewed, including Michael Allen and Benjamin Fordham using ICB and MID cases, and Diane Pfundstein Chamberlain using ICB data on U.S. compellent threats from 1945-2007.

Additional cases were sought in the U.S. government's Federal Register, congressional records, and the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) websites. Further study was conducted of press coverage for specific presidential administrations, generally relying on the Nexis Uni search engine. The goal of this extensive search was to aggregate the broadest possible set of coercive episodes across all coercive tools - diplomatic, military, and economic - in recognition of the fact that in practice, the U.S. government often uses them in combination. Several criteria (discussed below) were then applied to exclude from the set of coercive episodes that either lacked sufficient public documentation, or did not fit the theoretical criteria for bilateral coercive diplomacy.

### ***Exclusions from the Data Set ("ruling out")***

Estimates of the frequency of U.S. coercive diplomacy can vary, depending on whether an analyst wishes to consider economic, military, or diplomatic pressure separately or in combination. Furthermore, some coercive acts are discretely executed but not formally recorded, while others are considered or announced but not even partially fulfilled. Some punitive acts are legally mandated but involve no specific demand, and thus are not coercive on any specific point. Some types of coercive pressure are multilateral to a degree that specific bilateral demand

is difficult to ascertain. While acknowledging that an unambiguous count is not possible, the current study has “ruled in” cases in which demand, threat, some degree of implementation, and some type of target response are reflected in publicly available documents.

The following criteria were used to exclude cases from the data set.

<u>Exclusion Criteria</u>	<u>Rationale</u>
Non-U.S. coercer	Coercive diplomacy by other actors beyond scope of study
Pre-1990 coercion	Episodes occurring entirely or predominantly prior to 1990 beyond scope of study
Kingpin Act designations	Foreign Narcotics designation/targets individual criminals
Magnitsky Act designations	Not considered interstate coercion after adoption of Global Magnitsky (2017) broadened application from Russia to designated entities in numerous states. The initial application of Magnitsky in 2012 is considered a case, but subsequent applications of Global Magnitsky are not. The original act was clearly a targeted punishment for Russia, but Global Magnitsky and its numerous copycat laws in other countries became more of a global legal and norm-setting institution rather than a focused tool for specific episodes.
Non-certifications	Non-certification by executive branch for Trafficking in Persons, Foreign Terror Financing do not automatically generate sanctions
MID database cases	Exclude episodes that comprise one instance in an endemic pattern of friction - fishing rights, border demarcation, counter-terrorism “hot pursuit,” verbal threats without tangible action taken; many MID cases in Africa and Latin America fall into this category
Ukraine 2018-2019	POTUS reportedly implied a threat during phone call, but the nature of the postulated demand was unclear, the event was poorly documented, and aid was not in fact suspended
Vietnam residual	Sanctions from 1975 were not lifted until 1994, but this is considered a legacy sanction rather than post-Cold War sanction
El Salvador 1990-1993	This case from Hufbauer’s study does not have an extensive public evidentiary basis (CRS, OFAC, media reports)

Russia 1992-1993	This case from Hufbauer relates to the attempted coup against Gorbachev, which quickly failed due to internal opposition. There is little or no reporting on the sanctions or their effect.
Visa bans (some) 2002-2020	Following the U.S. Supreme Court 2002 <i>Zadvydas v. Davis</i> case requiring release of foreign nationals scheduled for deportation when country of origin refuses to accept them, the U.S. began suspending visa issuance for refusing (“recalcitrant”) countries. For this study, such sanctions were excluded if the target country was already subject to a broader set of sanctions (Iran, Syria) but included if the dispute over repatriation was the sole object of the visa pressure as a diplomatic sanction (Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan).

The 122 episodes identified here should be considered representative but not exhaustive. There may be different approaches to counting, dividing, or aggregating coercive activity, but in the absence of accepted methods for doing so, this set suffices for the purpose of policy analysis.

Scoring of the cases was obtained through an expert panel of eleven foreign policy practitioners, including military and diplomatic personnel with at least ten years of professional experience, scoring the 122 episodes based on the explanatory variables (IVs) and outcome variables (DVs) described in the text. Each expert was given a scoring rubric sheet and a portion of the 122 cases divided geographically to match their region of expertise (the Americas, Europe, Africa, Middle East/Central Asia, South and East Asia). The episodes in each region were scored by at least three of the members of the panel, and scores were averaged to determine final values.

To identify media frames, U.S. media outlets were searched using NEXIS to identify any framing elements (words, terms, or analogies) employed by the U.S. to conceptualize and publicly shape coercive episodes. Media outlets from the region of each coercive target were then sampled using to search for indicators that those framing elements were adopted or rejected in the target region and globally, and for indicators of change in public opinion or sentiment during the course of the coercive episode.

Inspired by the work of John Kingdon's *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy*, the study supplemented analysis of existing data and cases with interviews of a cross section of expert practitioners and scholars of foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> Interviews were conducted with diplomats, academicians, and politicians to gather insights on coercive episodes and validate the quantitative data and case studies. After reaching out through an established network of personal contacts among journalists, diplomats, and U.S. policy practitioners, the researcher posed questions tied to general themes reflective of coercive diplomacy literature but loosely enough constructed to allow the interviewees to drive the conversation and introduce their own propositions. The interviews were structured to interrogate empirical observations and propositions drawn from theory with personal experience. General themes and some specific quotations were recorded manually during the interviews, then member-checked with the interviewee after formal write-up. After the member-check, key themes and patterns were synthesized across the set of interviews and formed a set of key observations. The experts interviewed were a separate group from the ten-expert panel used to score coercive episodes for the quantitative portion of the study.

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<sup>2</sup> John Kingdon, *Agendas Alternatives and Public Policy* (2nd Edition, Pearson, NY, 2010).